Do as I say, not as I do. RSA, Bit9, Adobe, and others…

So you thought you had everything nailed down. You might have even gone past the “best practice” (which would have driven you to compliance, and your security to the gutter), and focused on protecting your assets by applying the right controls in a risk-focused way.

You had your processes, technologies, and logs all figured out.

But you still got owned. Want to know why? Because you are still a little naïve.

You put your trust in big name vendors that preached for you to get your stuff together. You listened to them, were convinced by their pitch, and you might have even put their products through rigorous testing to make sure they deliver. But you forgot one thing. Big ticket vendors are no much different from a zealot church.

They will preach, and guide you through to the righteous passage. But when you look behind the curtain, well, you know what I mean…

The latest Bit9 compromise isn’t that surprising. Bit9′s customers are obviously very security aware as they opted to use a whitelisting product to protect their computing assets. As such, these customers are most probably high value targets to adversaries. It also means that with such an awareness to security, these customers probably have more measures and practices to mitigate and protect themselves from attackers. That means, that if I were to scope such a target for an attack, I would have focused on supply chain elements that were weaker than the target itself (much like the way we teach at out Red-Team Testing classes…).

RSA was such a target. Adobe is a similar one. Bit9 just was for some of its customers.

Color me surprised.

And yes – if you are a vendor that gloats over the latest compromise – please don’t. If you haven’t gone through a similar threat model your products are either not good enough (hence your customers aren’t high value targets. How does that make you feel now?), or your own security isn’t up to speed and you haven’t realized you have been breached yet. Now go clean your own mess.

If you are a security consumer (hence – care a bit more for your information than just getting compliant and tabling it), make sure not to make any assumptions about your providers. Especially about your providers. They aren’t the target. You are. As such, they are the vehicle, and they have a more generalized security practice than yours. Account for it in your security strategy, and never fully trust anything outside of your control span. It is your responsibility to hold them to at least their own standard, and demand oversight and proof that they do so.

Phishing/Threatening done wrong

It’s been a long time since I posted here since life and work really got in the way (in a very good way!) to publishing here. But I just had to share this as it has some relevance to security…

So, woke up this morning to an email claiming to be from FARC (yes – the Colombian militant underground rebel thingy).
In preparation to our visit to Colombia next week, they welcome us “experts” and expect us to cooperate with them and help them. Something about being passed a note with a phone number when going through immigration, and calling them to coordinate a meeting. Sprinkled with a little threat that if we choose to ignore it, we are considered cooperating and supporting of the government and as such we are a target.

Now, I won’t go through all the mistakes, but seriously?

First – using a stupid “fake mailer” domain to send it (emkei.cz), is just very low.

Second – the attached PDF has no exploits, no trojans, nothing. At least TRY to humor me.

Last – come on, all of the speakers are “foreign”. None of us really speaks/reads spanish that well. Putting a note “Whether you need translation go google” at the top isn’t really showing a lot of investment from your end. The least you could do is get someone who speaks English to help you a bit.

I mean – this is what I do for a living. Next time – ping me before so we can at least get a decent domain, set up a nice mail service on it, get some content on it, generate some plausible background data, something…
Although we won’t have the red-team class next week, I highly suggest whoever tried this to spring up the money and fly to The Hague for the NCSC  Conference in January for our red-team class.
I personally promise free drinks from Chris Nickerson and myself if you can prove that you sent the email. And you know what – the class is on me. Just show up! :-)
Here’s the PDF if you are so inclined to have a laugh: Invitacion_FARC-EP
Update – December 1st, 2012: The Colombia National Police and Ministry of Defense have issued a letter stating that after investigating the issue, and working with the intelligence group, they have reached the same conclusion – this is NOT a letter that FARC has produced (duh – FARC would have done a much better job!), and is a fake. There is obviously no risk to the recipients of the letter. See you all in Colombia in a couple of days!
Update – December 10th, 2012: Well, we obviously made it back. No one handing any of us a piece of paper at the airport (and I’ve been through two, and trust me I tried ;-) ). No one threatening, or suggesting we should work for them (other than a great business dinner we had). Overall, this is the stuff that hoaxes and prejudice are made of. I guess that for laypersons this would be a big deterrent to showing up in a country that had its name smeared as much over a long time. For someone who has already experienced Colombia and knows something about security – not so much.
Just as an anecdote – attaching the letter that the national police has sent the organizers following the threat.
Oh, by the way – no one owned up to sending the letter so far, our invitation is still open for the Red-Team Training in January. You guys really need it, so here’s our community outreach to help out :-)

Vegas 2012 by the Numbers

So, I’m finally back from a very long week in Vegas. How long you ask? well, here are some numbers that start to reflect how it felt:

  • Number of days in Vegas: 6+1 (un-planned extra day due to a missed flight)
  • Number of conferences attended: 3.5 (BlackHat, BSidesLV, Defcon, and IOAsis counts as a 1/2 con…)
  • Number of talks given: 2 (in the same day… BlackHat + BSidesLV)
  • Number of shipments to my room at Caesars: 3 (shirts, phone, and locks which ended up unused due to my failure to run the lockpick sessions at IOAsis :-( )
  • Volunteer gigs: 2 (BSidesLV and Skytalks)
  • Average hours of sleep per night: 3 (and that’s really stretching it)
  • Number of nights I went to sleep after sunrise: 2
  • Average number of parties visited per night: 3 (Freakshow skewed the numbers as there was NO reason to leave that place…)
  • No. of phones I came in with: 1
  • No. of phones I left with: 3 (Thank you NinjaTel!)
  • Average no. of meals per day: 1 (I know… but Alcohol does not count as food unfortunately)
  • Gallons of booze consumed: probably illegal in some states.
  • No of friends I caught up with: not enough. And the ones I did manage to catch up with needed much more time :-(
  • Hangovers: 0 (keep drinking -> no hangover to deal with…)
  • Workouts: 2
  • Miles walked: waaaaay too many
  • Weight lost/gain: 3.5lbs lost. Guess that’s the result of adrenaline rushes, parties, Infected Mushroom, long walks in the hallways, not much food, and lots of alcohol.

Overall this was personally the best Vegas trip I’ve had. I did take up a little too much on myself that I should have (as a couple fo friends duly noted, and excused me for some fuckups due to that), and I wanted to meet so many more people that I managed to somehow miss this year.

Nevertheless, some of the experiences were priceless – like having a chat with Infected Mushroom and finding out that Erez used to run a BBS back in the days, and that (although I don’t like to mention my darker days of hacking) we “knew” the same scenes. Having the opportunity to help out with BSidesLV and being amazed again by our community and what it can achieve. Being inspired by so many people, and learning constantly. These are the things that really make up the week of BlackHat/BSides/Defcon for me. It’s not necessarily the talks, but the socializing and the opportunity to pick people’s brains on a personal basis which makes it worthwhile to get to the levels of exhaustion that this week takes you to.

Guess it’s time to wrap up and figure out what timezone my body is on…

This one time, at Defcon… (a blast from the past)

Wow, there’s a blog here…

Lucky for me there are other people who write new content that somehow relates to this blog so I have a chance to point to them and say “cool stuff, look there!”.

My good friend Itzik Kotler has just written a blog post about bypassing DLP systems using some of our elements from last year’s DefCon talk (and BSides, and Hashdays, and Brucon, you get the idea…). It features some awkwardly written code (yours truly) and some wickedly useful evasion techniques (still mostly unhandled :-) ).

The post is right here: http://blog.ikotler.org/2012/07/modulation-and-data-loss-prevention-dlp.html so go check out Itzik’s blog, and feel free to fork off the code and improve (fix?) it.

See you all in a couple of weeks in Vegas! (at the SexyDefense session…)

SexyDefense comes to Vegas!

One of the best things that probably happened to the research on SexyDefense is that it has been accepted to BlackHat Briefings in Las Vegas!

It is truly one of the highest indicators for me that we are on the right track in making some change in the defensive paradigm, especially in light of the newly added defense track for BlackHat. An opportunity to capture the attention of a large and high-visibility audience while putting a harsh mirror in their faces is something that I have been looking forward to do for some time.

So there you go – Vegas this year is shaping up to be really interesting. With BSidesLV (in which I’m also involved as a volunteer and mentor) running along BlackHat, and the 20th DefCon, you really can’t miss it.

See you all there!

Sexy Defense

So, Source Boston proved to be a great venue for the inauguration of the Sexy Defense paper and talk that I was working on recently. Had a great time both developing the concepts, as well as discussing them before, on stage, and especially after the talk.

I really was amazed by the great feedback that people had to this, especially from some of my more respected peers. It’s always a great feeling to get an “attaboy” from people you consider experts in their fields.

For convenience, here is the slide-deck I used during the talk. Would love to get more feedback and ideas for pushing this forward into more organizations, and to hear about ways to improve both on the strategy itself, as well as on how to “sell” it, or get organizational “buy-in” internally.

Last but not least – this could not have been done without the support and the peer-review from some of my friends and colleagues: Chris Nickerson, Brian Honan, Chris John Riley, Wim Remes, and Leon van der Eijk. Thanks for going through this and providing excellent commentary and insights!

 

Update: Dark Reading have posted a great article by Robert Lemos covering the topic, with a really insightful analysis and additional views.

Hackers, Credit Cards, and the Media

In the past couple of weeks there has been an interesting “hacking” trend going on in Israel. It started from the publication of a few thousand credit card records (out of an alleged 400,000). Continued with the publication of “SCADA” systems with default credentials, and a handful of gov.il email addresses and passwords, and more recently with the DDoS on the public site of the Tel-Aviv Stock Exchange, and ElAl Arilines.

We call these events “hacking” (quotes) on purpose. Following is a basic analysis of what has been done, some impact analysis on it, and an outlook for the continuation of such events and their escalation.

Analysis of past events

First things first – the credit card leak that started it all wasn’t real news. All the records pertain to older attacks on some poorly secured internet merchants (mostly coupon deals) which stored credit card records (illegal) in an insecure way (malpractice). The “news” about the leak was the aggregation of these records, and the publication in a media context of “Cyberwar against Israel”. What made this fairly insignificant event into newsworthy was… the news. The media attention thrown on it was unprecedented, and the number of “cyber consultants” (I’m not making this up) who provided content-less interviews gave the impression that the infosec industry in Israel is 10 times bigger than it really is.

For the person/s (0xOmar) who published the regurgitated information this was pure win – exactly what they were looking for. This would have ended with that unless two things happened:

  • Danny Ayalon – the vice-minister of foreign affairs has been quoted saying that this attack should be regarded as an act of terror
  • Several groups of script kiddies from Israel started working on a vengeance against Saudi credit card holders.

Both actions are regarded as knee-jerk responses, and there is no way to look at them in any productive means (strategic nor tactical). Nevertheless, the combination of said actions, and the continued excessive media coverage basically led the way to an escalation in the activities.

The next action, although not a real escalation yet, showed how 0xOmar turned essentially into a brand much like Anonymous, where information on alleged Israeli “SCADA” systems logins and gov.il email addresses was made public. This leak, now not directly associated with 0xOmar turned the attention of some Anonymous twitter accounts into supporting the newly tagged “#fuckIsrael” activities.

When looking at the “SCADA” leak, it is easy to see that none of the systems quoted are actually SCADA related, but mostly content management systems, some wireless routers installed at residential locations, and a car booking system. The email addresses and passwords (and hashes) are all from the STRATFOR leak which happened a couple of weeks beforehand (and even there it didn’t contain the hundreds of really interesting Israeli related information).

Nevertheless – media attention was at full force, and the attempts to “out” who 0xOmar only fueled the ego behind the alias more. Combined with the newfound attention from the Anonymous brand as well, additional groups started to join the party, and the last escalation in activities showed for the first time an actual activity against Israeli associated facilities – the DDoS on the stock exchange and ElAl’s websites. Again – the choice of targets is not coincidental: both sites are well known and are strongly associated with Israeli media around the world (financial, and the national airline). These are not strategic targets of a classic “cyberwar” but more of a “media-war”.

This latest attack, while inflicting minimal (if at all) damage to the targets, should raise a lot of hard questions for the relevant CISOs who failed to recognize the threat communities they are facing (especially in light of the media attention), and the defenses put in place to greet such communities. Additionally, mitigation tactics of such attacks has been out there for quite a while, and even a simple CDN solution would have easily coped with them.

Escalation and Triggers

The escalation has already started from the attacking side. We see more groups that were previously unassociated with 0xOmar join into the game – especially now when its has been expanded to include more media support from some anon factions. These groups widen the threat communities that are now part of the threat model which Israeli organizations have to deal with, along with their associated threat capabilities.

We expect that the attacks would continue – especially is media coverage of this will continue to be provided in prime-time. Additionally, groups that are currently in holding pattern on whether to join the action will be more keen to do so if a direct retaliation will be launched from the Israeli side. Such a retaliation could be additional attempts to “out” 0xOmar using diplomatic ties, attacks on hacker forums associated with the recent activities or anything that would be portrayed as a violation of rights in international eyes.

An escalation in the attacks would mean that additional groups, who also bring additional capabilities to the table, would be able to launch much more targeted attacks against more strategic targets. If the attacks so far focused on the media value, further attacks would escalate to (in order): financials, defense contractors, government, and finally high-value individuals.

We hope that this analysis sheds some light on the motivations and the actual impact of the recent events, and would prevent any escalation – both in the response from the local hacking groups, from the media as well as from the assorted groups that were ad-hoc strung together to form this chain of events.